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Abstract 
 
 
Rape and sexual violence has been a part of war throughout history. Wartime rape that 
occurred during the 20th century was often marked by public spectacle and brutality, 
which caught the attention of the world in new ways. Scholars, policymakers and the 
general public now consider how militaries and armed groups use rape as a tool of ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, meaning that this form of violence is used to hinder the health 
and growth of the enemy population. This study draws upon feminist literature, 
humanitarian intervention discourse, and international relations literature to develop a 
feminist intersectional framework with which to view international responses and 
interventions in cases of wartime rape. To conduct a qualitative multi-case study, this 
study reviews organizational reports and findings by truth commissions, international 
entities, and state actors for the conflicts in Guatemala from 1960 to 1996 and in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 1992-1995. This study finds that without a feminist and 
intersectional framework, interventions are likely to fail to effectively support and seek 
justice for survivors of wartime rape, to prosecute perpetrators, and to change the culture 
of silence that discourages survivors from seeking justice. The findings of this study have 
implications for international policy, and recommendations that future research into 
wartime sexual violence expand their frameworks to be more intersectional.
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I. Introduction 
 
“Not one day passes that I haven’t said something about it. That means it is on my mind 
all the time. I can’t understand […] All I worry about now is that I’m neat, that I’m not 
filthy, and I pray to dear Allah to keep me sane, to keep me aware and reasonable, so 
that I can communicate normally with people.” Zumra, a rape survivor from Srebrenica, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina1 
 
During wartime, militaries use the strategies at their disposal to achieve their 
goals. One would reasonably expect militaries to use strategies such as negotiation, 
insurgency, counter-insurgency or various other tactics, but militaries and armed groups 
are capable of using horrifying acts to achieve their ends. Kidnapping, murdering, raping 
and forcibly disappearing the enemy, both combatants and civilians, are amongst these 
strategies. Wartime rape, in particular, has long-lasting consequences not only for the 
victim, but also for entire communities and cultural ideologies.2 While rape and sexual 
violence have been linked to war throughout history and international awareness of these 
actions has evolved with increased public awareness about the mass rapes in Nanking in 
1938 and the Japanese military’s rapes of Korean comfort women between 1932 and 
1945, the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995 and the conflict-related 
sexual violence that took place during the war redefined how rape is used by militaries as 
a tool for genocide.  
This study seeks to answer the question, how can post-war solutions to wartime 
rape be most effective? This study assumes that these post-war solutions must achieve 
two goals to be effective: 1) to obtain justice and recovery for victims, 2) to change the 
culture that makes wartime rape possible. The use of “culture” here refers to local, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Selma Leydesdorff, “Narratives of Survivors of Srebrenica,” in Women and Genocide, ed. Elissa 
Bemporad and Joyce W. Warren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018): 262. 
2 Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Human Security and Gender Violence,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, 
44/45 (2005): 4730. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4417359. 
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national and international shame, silence, and stigma surrounding wartime rape that 
discourages survivors from seeking justice and allows perpetrators to enjoy impunity. 
This environment of silence and impunity emboldens armed groups to continue to use 
wartime rape as a strategy of war because they know there will be few, if any 
consequences for their actions. This study first reviews feminist and non-feminist 
literature on wartime rape in order to synthesize a theoretical framework on the nature of 
wartime rape. It then highlights the current debates and perspectives within the literature 
on humanitarian intervention to contextualize wartime rape to a response-based 
perspective. Finally, it discusses studies on gender inequality and sexual violence within 
feminist international relations to provide reasoning for how wartime rape has wide-scale, 
long-term effects on the international community, and explain why the international 
community should place a higher priority on responding to cases of wartime rape. The 
literature review sheds light on essential background questions: Is wartime rape an 
inevitable aspect of war? Can post-war solutions be effective without victim narratives? 
Can the environment of silence that usually exists in these societies sustain effective post-
war solutions? What is the international community’s responsibility to step in to “solve” 
cases of wartime rape? Answering these questions helps to formulate effective responses 
to occurrences of sexual violence during conflict. It should be noted that this study is not 
considering prevention strategies except when they coincide with practical post-war 
solutions to wartime rape. This is because this study specifically seeks to assess the 
responses to sexual violence during conflict after it occurs and understand what kind of 
elements go into an effective response. 
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 For ease of understanding, some key terms within this study must be defined. 
Wartime rape is phrased throughout various studies as “war rape” or “sexual violence 
during conflict,” and refers to a strategy used by militaries and other armed actors within 
a conflict (i.e. guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups, non-government armed 
forces) that uses forced sexual acts, which include sterilization, to achieve the goals of the 
actor. While wartime rape is not viewed within this study as an extension of non-war 
rape, there are authors cited within this study that hold this view. Some authors that are 
included have a stated, or implied, view of rape within a wartime context that soldiers 
rape as a reward for their conquests, hereafter referred to as a “spoils of war” view of the 
subject. These views are included within this study to show the change in the discourse 
on this subject over time as well as to answer existential questions about the nature of 
rape within the context of conflict, such as whether rape is inevitable in war. 
Furthermore, wartime rape can affect men, women and children of various ethnicities and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. It is important not to forget the male victims of wartime 
rape, as is sometimes the case in literature concerning sexual violence. However, the 
majority of victims of wartime rape are female, and feminist theorists have showed that 
even when men are victims of sexual violence during conflict, the social and military 
systems that perpetuate wartime rape are most often patriarchal in nature. 
 This study reviews responses by the international community to the wartime rape 
that occurred during the Guatemalan Civil War of 1960 to 1996, and the Bosnian War of 
1992 to 1995. This study is primarily focusing on the aftermath of conflicts, and terms 
like “post-war actions,” “solutions,” and “interventions” refer to the actions that are taken 
in the wake of a conflict in which military groups used rape as a strategy. This study 
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notes that effective actions attempt to achieve two ends: to secure justice for the victims, 
and to hold perpetrators accountable. Justice for victims may include reparations in the 
form of compensation; recovery for physical, emotional and psychological trauma; and 
support in sharing narratives of their trauma. Because so many cases of wartime rape go 
unpunished with perpetrators enjoying impunity, this study seeks out post-war actions 
that work to change this standard. This study finds that responses to wartime rape are 
most effective when they are carried out with a feminist, intersectional framework that 
takes into account identity-based factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, socio-
political identity, religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Because these factors 
are often highly relevant to conflicts, as they were in both the Guatemalan civil war and 
the Bosnian War, responses to wartime rape that occur during such conflicts must be 
formulated around them. When responses to wartime rape fail to use this approach, 
survivors get left behind, perpetrators continue to experience impunity for their crimes, 
and the culture of silence that stigmatizes rape victims continues unchallenged. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Perspectives on Wartime Rape 
 
Literature on wartime rape often utilizes feminist theory, though not always. In 
the past two decades, scholarship on this subject has moved from an emphasis on victim 
narrativization and women’s roles in the context of wartime rape to a more response-
based approach that centers intersectionality. Throughout this progression, there are 
several points of contention. This section discusses how scholars over time have defined 
wartime rape in different ways, whether or not rape is inevitable in war, how to approach 
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victim narrativization, the role of women in both contexts of survivors and responders to 
wartime rape, and how intersectional theory can be used to develop deeper and more 
meaningful responses to wartime rape.  
No discussion of rape during conflict would be complete without mentioning Iris 
Chang’s 1997 The Rape of Nanking, a best-selling non-fiction account of the 1937-1938 
mass rape and murder in the Chinese city, Nanjing. Chang’s motivation for publishing 
her book, which was met with international praise (with the notable exception of the 
Japanese government’s negative reaction), was to shed light on a brutal massacre of the 
World War II era that had been largely ignored and forgotten by the international public.3 
Chang provides perspective of the massacre from the perspective of the survivors, the 
perpetrators, as well as the international community, choosing to allow the reader to 
develop their own narrative based on the accounts given. Because the priority of this 
book was to spread awareness of the Nanjing Massacre, Chang doesn’t explicitly use 
social theory to explain why the violence occurred. Instead, she highlights how the 
militarization of Japanese society in the years leading up to the Sino-Japanese War 
densensitized male soldiers to mass killing, rape, and torture: “The molding of young 
men to serve in the Japanese military began early in life, and in the 1930s the martial 
influence seeped into every aspect of Japanese boyhood.”4 Thus, Chang implicitly points 
to the masculinization of war as some reasoning for wartime rape. In response to some 
authors who had pointed to general Japanese culture and religion for the Rape of 
Nanking, Chang states, “no race or culture has a monopoly on wartime cruelty.”5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 14. 
4 Chang, Rape of Nanking, 29. 
5 Chang, Rape of Nanking, 55. 
6	  	  
When it comes to discussion on wartime rape that is more explicit about how to 
view the issue through a theoretical framework, the points of contention begin with a 
definitional divide. Wartime rape differs from rape during peacetime in a number of 
fundamental ways. Some view wartime rape as an extension of non-war rape made more 
extreme by the violent circumstances of war. This argument can be summarized as thus: 
soldiers commit atrocious acts during war because they want to commit these acts as 
individuals, and the environment and atmosphere of war (in which violence is acceptable, 
in which society is not expected to function normally, and in which the norms of society 
are expected to be broken) allows these individuals to act more freely than they do during 
peacetime. Ronit Lentin (1999) classifies this argument as the transgressive argument, 
which is contrasted against the militarism argument.6 The latter argues that sexual 
violence during times of war occurs because male exceptionalism requires an elevation of 
‘our’ women and a degradation of ‘theirs.’ Lentin disagrees with both of these arguments, 
instead positing that women’s bodies become physical territory during war to be 
conquered and destroyed. 
While the nature of feminist discourse often leads to important critiques and 
realizations about wartime rape, Lentin acknowledges that these discourses can be too 
generalizing at times. Equating victims of wartime rape to women excludes men and 
children who are victims of rape by military, as well as women who perpetuate and 
support wartime rape. However, it would be misguided to deny that rape as military 
strategy is not gendered. Lentin first considers feminist discourses on wartime rape and 
engages with explanations for why it occurs and what causes militaries to use rape 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ronit Lentin, “The Rape of the Nation: Women Narrativising Genocide,” Sociological Research Online 4, 
2 (1999): 1.1-4.10. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/4/2/lentin/html. 
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strategically. She problematizes the consideration of wartime rape as a form of sexual 
violence, arguing that this explanation ‘eroticizes’ the act. Instead, scholars should 
consider wartime rape gendered violence that intersects with ethnicity and nationality. 
Furthermore, Lentin argues, “wartime rape must ultimately be seen as the rape of the 
nation,”7 that raping “the enemy’s women” is never solely about sex, or power over 
women, but is about taking enemy territory. Lentin pushes for victim narrativization as a 
vital feminist strategy to allow both survivors and the nation to heal from the trauma of 
genocide and the gendered violence that results from it.  
Julie Hastings (2002) also places emphasis on victim narrativization. She 
examines the lack of survivors’ narratives on wartime rape, focusing exclusively victims 
of state-sponsored rape during the Guatemalan Civil War. After finding that studies on 
the wartime rape during this period often lacked first-hand accounts by the survivors, 
Hastings conducted interviews in Guatemala and refugee camps elsewhere to try to 
include this lost narrative. Often, interviewees would speak of the violence as something 
that happened to others, and there was a lack of personal accounts of the violence. While 
many researchers have pointed to local communities’ cultures of shame, self-blame, guilt, 
and silence surrounding wartime rape (Di Lellio 2016, Clark 2016, Chu 2017, Lentin 
1999), Hastings argues that researchers must look beyond local cultural ideology about 
rape to the international socio-political testimonio discourse, a Latin American cultural 
discourse that conveys accounts of personal suffering that is told by individuals but 
representative of collective experience. State-sponsored rape “did not conform to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lentin, “The Rape of the Nation,” 5. 
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strategic, political claims through which the testimonio genre was constructed.”8 
Additionally, Hastings argues that, 
“Governments, including that of the United States, have routinely denied 
political asylum to survivors of state-sponsored rape because it is not 
considered a political crime. Consequently, Joseño survivors have little 
political incentive to offer their personal testimonios of wartime rape. To 
do so would entail the risk of being set apart as gendered victims rather 
than as political victims and hence excluded from the category of 
legitimate refugee.”9 
 
Nancy Farwell (2004) continues the tradition of emphasizing victim 
narrativization, but moves to a more response-based approach by focussing equally on 
women as responders to wartime rape. She names direct intervention, scholarship, 
advocacy, documentation and fundraising as methods female activists have used to show 
solidarity with survivors and develop feminist responses to conflict-based sexual 
violence.10 She also takes a strong position that rape in war is not inevitable, and that the 
implications of this belief have severe consequences.11 Scholars who accept rape during 
war as inevitable mischaracterize why wartime rape occurs, Farwell argues. This 
mischaracterization goes back to the common misunderstanding that wartime rape is less 
about military strategy and more about sexual power dynamics, the “spoils of war” type 
of view. Farwell worries that “accepting rape as an inevitable aspect of armed conflict 
can lead to condoning it and thereby to an overt strategy that utilizes rape as a weapon of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Julie A. Hastings, “Silencing State-Sponsored Rape in and Beyond a Transnational Guatemalan 
Community,” Violence Against Women 8, 10 (2002): 1156. doi: 10.1177/107780102236531. 
9 Hastings, “Silencing State-Sponsored Rape,” 1156. 
10 Nancy Farwell, “War Rape: New Conceptualizations and Responses,” Affilia 19, 4 (2004): 389. doi: 
10.1177/0886109904268868. 
11 Farwell, “War Rape,” 589.  
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war.”12 She also defines war rape as “an act of aggression by one nation or faction 
against another,”13 rather than rape that occurs within the military.  
Eileen Zurbriggen (2010), on the other hand, finds a conceptual link between rape 
and war. She first outlines how rape is correlated with war “at a macro level,” citing 
ancient texts that discuss the two in conjunction, how there are high rates of rape 
(specified in the study as being against women) within the U.S. military, how 
communities that lack frequent conflict have been shown to lack frequent rape, and how 
spousal rape may be more common amongst military families than non-military 
families.14 The reason that rape and war are so connected, Zurbriggen explains, is that 
each “require many elements of traditional masculine socialization in order to be 
possible.”15 While this study examines war and rape within the context of traditional 
masculinity in great detail, it doesn’t examine wartime rape as a phenomenon separate 
from non-war rape, and makes little mention of rape as a military strategy. What it does 
say is that war as it is waged currently and as it has been waged historically depends on 
traditional masculine elements to be effective. The implications are thus, 
“A society that trains its members (whether male or female) to eschew the 
values of traditional masculinity (including toughness, aggression, 
tolerance of violence, respect for hierarchy, restricted emotionality, 
dominance and power, and self-reliance) will not be able to train soldier to 
kill, nor to wage war effectively.”16 
 
Furthermore, Zurbriggen emphasizes prevention as a strategy to reduce rape, which to her 
is the best-case scenario due to her view that rape in war is inevitable. She recommends 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Farwell, “War Rape,” 589. 
13 Farwell, “War Rape,” 591. 
14 Eileen L Zurbriggen, “Rape, War, and the Socialization of Masculinity: Why Our Refusal to Give Up 
War Ensures that Rape Cannot be Eradicated,” Psychology of Women Quarterly 34 (2010): 538. 
SAGEJournals.  
15 Zurbriggen, “Rape, War,” 538. 
16 Zurbriggen, “Rape, War,” 544. 
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that militaries use stricter rules of engagement to “create boundaries and to ensure that 
violence is directed only toward the enemy, rather than more diffusely.”17 When 
considering Lentin’s positioning of wartime rape as rape of the nation, and Farwell’s 
perspective that war rape is an act of aggression between nations, this strategy loses its 
relevancy, because the identity of “the enemy” is extended to civilians, particularly 
women. 
Victoria Sanford, Sofia Alvarez-Arenas and Kathleen Dill (2016) extend the 
argument that militaries seek to conquer and destroy women’s bodies through sexual 
violence as a method to destroy territory. After calling the argument that war rape is an 
extension of non-war rape “no longer a tenable theory,”18 they argue that the work of 
feminist research, human rights advocates, international investigative bodies and 
international courts have reframed the issue of wartime rape to centre on how militaries 
use women’s bodies as “an important site of war, which makes sexual violence an 
integral part of wartime strategy.”19 Sanford et al. acknowledge the role of neo-
colonialism in Latin America when considering the Guatemalan Civil War as a case of 
wartime rape, writing, “Power in Guatemala is a racialized phenomenon and the symbolic 
superiority of white and ladino men over the Maya was a catalyst for genocidal 
violence.”20 The recognition of Latin America’s colonial legacy engages with Hastings’ 
consideration of testimonio discourse, and evolves the victim narrativization discourse to 
be more sensitive to larger historical trauma. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Zurbriggen, “Rape, War,” 545. 
18 Victoria Sanford, Sofia Duyos Alvarez-Arenas, and Kathleen Dill, “Sexual Violence as a Weapon during 
the Guatemalan Genocide,” in Women and Genocide, ed. Elissa Bemporad and Joyce W. Warren 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018), 209. 
19 Sanford, “Sexual Violence,” 209. 
20 Sanford, “Sexual Violence,” 214. 
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 More recent literature is increasingly moving towards a response-based approach 
that utilizes feminist intersectional theory as a framework for discussing and responding 
to cases of wartime rape. Nicola Henry (2016) points out that a lack of a strong 
theoretical framework could be the reason that it’s difficult for feminist scholars to agree 
on the structural context of wartime rape, and suggests that using intersectionality would 
help bridge the divides that exist between different areas of research, such as between 
gender inequality, victimization and imperialism. Henry defines intersectionality as “the 
study of the cross-cutting hierarchies of power or ‘intersections’ 
(interconnections/relationships) between disadvantage, discrimination, and oppression on 
the basis of race, class, and sex.”21 To further strengthen consensus of why cases of 
wartime rape occur and what should be done in response, Henry emphasizes the need for 
stronger documentation. This recommendation moves beyond strict victim narrativization 
and pushes governments and the international community to participate in narrativizing 
rape in war.  Scholars that develop new methods of theorizing wartime rape can better 
inform practical prevention and responses to the violence.22 Lailatul Fitriyah (2016) 
extends the argument in favor of an intersectional approach, which she defines as “an 
approach that views an individual’s experience of sexual and gender-based violence as 
resulting from multi-layered facets of socio-political, economic, cultural and religious 
oppressions, in addition to sexual and gendered violence.”23 Using an intersectional 
framework strengthens a researcher’s ability to listen to survivor’s narratives without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Nicola Henry, “Theorizing Wartime Rape: Deconstructing Gender, Sexuality, and Violence,” Gender & 
Society 30, 1 (2016): 51. doi: 10.1177/0891243215608780. 
22 Henry, “Theorizing Wartime Rape,” 53. 
23 Lailatul Fitriah, “Intersectionality, sexual and gender-based violence and humanitarian intervention,” 
Horn of Africa Bulletin 28, 2 (2016): 17. 
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imposing personal ideas of their experiences.24 Fitriyah continues the movement towards 
a response-based approach in recommending that humanitarian interventions utilize 
intersectional theory. 
Feminist researchers that move beyond theory and into fieldwork experience a 
number of obstacles when working with survivors of wartime sexual violence. In order 
for any large-scale interventions to take place in situations where sexual violence during 
conflict occurs, human rights organizations and the international community need to be 
aware of it first. Therefore, the first step of the intervention process is the collection and 
distribution of information that wartime rape and sexual violence is taking place, but this 
can be difficult to accomplish when local communities ostracize survivors for speaking 
about the violence that they experienced. For this reason, Anna Di Lellio (2016) points 
out that women’s advocacy groups and networks were the first to document the sexual 
violence occurring during the conflict in Kosovo because of their intimate connection to 
the region and culture and their sensitivity in working with survivors.25 Rather than work 
with these groups in addressing the violence that was occurring, however, Di Lellio 
writes that NATO’s intervention into Kosovo silenced women’s perspectives and 
advocacy for survivors of sexual violence, while the United Nations’ intervention ignored 
women activists.26 The importance of protecting survivors who tell their stories then is 
connected to protecting and working with organizations and networks that are supporting 
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survivors of wartime rape. Lentin concurs,27 arguing that because wartime rape is so 
traumatic for victims to speak of, interventions and responses to wartime rape must work 
to preserve the memory of the crimes that happened while offering victims justice and 
rehabilitation. 
 Di Lellio also writes that in recognizing how ethnic conflict intersects with sexual 
violence, researchers and interventions can better understand how to help victims recover 
from the violence that occurred. To achieve this, however, Di Lellio argues in favor of a 
constructivist model. Constructivism can be translated into practice by centering 
interventions as human rights projects that “is sensitive to political change and to 
mutable, sometimes contradictory, priorities over time.”28 In doing so, interventions can 
leave behind the problematic dichotomies that too often guide them (i.e. victims being 
torn between tradition and modernity when speaking out; the fiction that all victims are 
women and all perpetrators are men) and be more focused on supplying victims with 
what is needed at each point in the transition from violence to peace. Di Lellio warns that 
such interventions fail in this approach when they are packaged as vessels for truth, 
reconciliation and justice, as these values are inflexible to the changes that often occur 
over time in a post-violence area. Finally, Di Lellio echoes Hastings’ problematizing of 
the local-international dichotomy in which local cultures are typically held solely 
responsible for the culture of shame and stigma survivors face, while building upon 
Farwell’s encouragement for women to lead responses to wartime rape: 
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“I [suggest] that the inclusion of women and their agendas, as well as the 
struggle by women’s networks to obtain inclusion, makes for greater 
effectiveness of transitional justice as a human rights project in general.”29 
 
Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Considering the literature on humanitarian intervention helps to explain how the 
international community can effectively intervene in cases of wartime rape. Theorists and 
researchers within humanitarian intervention literature debate about when humanitarian 
intervention should be used, what level of force should be exercised in interventions, and 
who the intervening actors should be.  
 The most important point of contention within humanitarian intervention 
literature for the purpose of this study is what such interventions should look like 
regarding responses to human rights abuses, the deliverance of humanitarian aid, and the 
use of force. In the war in Bosnia, the international community didn’t intervene until late 
in the conflict, and the United States didn’t send troops until the war had ended. The 
outrage that the human rights abuses of the war generated largely prompted the United 
Nations peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR), and therefore a significant part of the 
intervention was focused on delivering humanitarian aid to those in need. However, the 
intervention’s lack of force eroded public confidence in it, as Robert DiPrizio writes, 
“UNPROFOR was to use force only for self-defense or in defense of convoys under its 
protection, not to protect civilians.”30 While the intervention was effective in delivering 
humanitarian aid in the form of food and clothing, as well as rebuilding infrastructure and 
designating safe havens, UNPROFOR sometimes hindered the ability of other groups to 
persuade the Serbs to end the war. DiPrizio argues that the failure of the international 	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communities’ interventions was due to their unwillingness to use force to protect 
civilians. To reiterate, Di Lellio argues that the intervention was ineffective in protecting 
survivors of sexual violence because of its failure to work with women’s advocacy 
groups and networks. The limitations within humanitarian intervention literature become 
clear here, because while DiPrizio follows the line of reasoning that the intervention in 
Bosnia didn’t work hard enough to protect civilians, the lack of a gender-based or 
intersectional framework leaves out the victims of violence that Di Lellio writes about. 
 Carrie Booth Walling (2013) approaches the failure on the part of the 
international community to effectively intervene in the war in Bosnia from the 
perspective of confusion within the United Nations and the international community 
regarding how the conflict should have been viewed. This conflict raised fundamental 
questions for the United Nations and the international community regarding how to 
intervene in complex conflicts when all sides are culpable for violations of human rights, 
and where claims to sovereignty were unclear. Walling discusses three major stories that 
emerged as a way of understanding the war: the intentional story described an external 
conflict in which Serbians were the main aggressors, joined at times by Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims, the latter of whom were the target of Serbia’s campaign of aggression 
in the form of ethnic cleansing. The inadvertent story characterized the war as 
triangular—that is, in which all parties (Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims) were 
aggressive towards each other—and in which sovereign authority was indeterminate. 
Finally, the complex story described a situation in which the war had “multiple 
underlying causes—some of them structural and others behavioural—and even multiple 
forms (both a civil war and an inter-state conflict) that led to inadvertent deaths and elite-
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organized human rights violations.”31 In this version of the story, sovereignty was 
contested. Walling argues that because the cause of the war was so highly contested by 
the international community, the United Nations and other intervening actors could not 
decide how best to intervene in the conflict, which made granting the use of force highly 
controversial. 
 Interventions operate within theoretical frameworks. When these frameworks are 
too broad and don’t consider the victims and perpetrators of violence through an 
intersectional lens, certain practices that look like solutions can make matters worse for 
those experiencing violence. Humanitarian interventions often implement safe havens 
where victims of violence can supposedly receive medical support, humanitarian aid and 
protection from violence. In reality, the use of safe havens is sometimes taken advantage 
of by groups who sought to continue the mass rape of women, as one survivor of wartime 
rape during the Bangladesh Liberation War recounted.32 After escaping confinement 
where she was brutally raped by Pakistani soldiers, this survivor was lured into a brothel 
that was disguised as a safe haven for victims of rape. In the war in Bosnia, the United 
Nations designated the small town of Srebrenica a UN Safe Area that was guaranteed 
protection by UN peacekeepers. Yet the peacekeepers’ lack of sufficient arms and 
preparedness for long-term protection of the town and its inhabitants led to Srebrenica 
falling into Serb hands in 1995, leading to the massacre of 7,749 people, along with the 
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mass rape of the town’s inhabitants.33 Humanitarian interventions must utilize 
intersectional frameworks in order to prevent creating more human rights abuses on top 
of those that are already occurring in a conflict. 
 
Feminist International Relations 
 
Sexual violence in conflict has long-term socio-political consequences for local, 
national, and international communities. Feminist international relations discourse offers 
a macro lens to consider these consequences. Mary Caprioli (2001) builds on 
international relations literature as well as feminist literature to argue that states with 
higher levels of domestic gender inequality are more likely to exhibit violence abroad.34 
When sexual violence during conflict is effectively addressed, it can improve gender 
equality in the long term. Interventions that sufficiently protect survivors of wartime rape 
and grant them justice empower survivors to speak out and can potentially lessen the 
stigma surrounding sexual violence during conflict.  
Radhika Coomaraswamy (2005) further contextualizes how sexual violence 
during conflict has severe consequences for society. The trauma of victims’ experiences 
can lead to unemployment, a lack of social and economic mobility and even a lack of 
physical mobility, as only 18% of women in Bangladesh feel comfortable leaving their 
homes by themselves. Coomaraswamy notes, “Living in anticipation of violence […] 
makes women search out men for protection rather than companionship and makes 
women dependent and vulnerable. Fear then socializes women to conform to the very 
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ideological norms that ensure their subordination.”35 While the international bodies have 
spelled out recommendations for addressing violence against women, such as through 
CEDAW and the UN declaration on violence against women, the changes in many 
countries’ policy framework has not had a significant effect on the local level, which is 
the most crucial level for change to occur. While important changes have been made at 
the national and legal levels in south Asian states, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka and more, Coomaraswamy points out that “violence against women can only be 
combated if there is a healthy partnership between women’s groups and the state 
apparatus […] Fighting violence against women will only succeed if it is done through 
the lens of human rights, protecting the rights and dignity of the woman survivor while 
ensuring a fair trial for the perpetrator.”36 
Within the literature and debate surrounding sexual violence during conflict, there 
exists a gap of studies that consider how effective state, intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental responses have been in supporting survivors through rehabilitation and 
reparations, reducing impunity for perpetrators, and changing the culture of violence that 
surrounds wartime rape. This study fills the void of research on practical responses to 
wartime rape and makes recommendations for incorporating a more intersectional 
framework into post-conflict actions.	  
III. Theoretical Framework 
 
Wartime rape is often phrased as being a weapon of war, which situates the act as 
part of military strategy. Feminist discourse on wartime rape has theorized many different 
causes of rape being used as military strategy, which often depend on the conflict during 	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which it occurs.373839 Japanese soldiers used Korean “comfort women” to situate the 
enemy woman as territory to be exploited and humiliated; Serbian soldiers used rape and 
forced sterilization as a way to suppress unwanted ethnicities during the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 1992-1995; Guatemalan soldiers raped Maya women as a tool for 
genocide during the Guatemalan Civil War in the latter half of the twentieth century. As 
the international community became more aware of wartime rape, feminist scholars 
increasingly warned against simplifying the issue in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and other social factors. For example, when womanhood is equated 
to victimhood, women who perpetuate or support wartime rape as excluded from the 
conversation, as are men and children who are victims of wartime rape. Still, it is useful 
to point out the patterns that occur in cases of wartime rape, which can be generalized to 
four main points: first, that militaries and other groups within a conflict use rape as a 
strategic weapon to achieve various ends, which depends not only on the military’s 
strategic goals, but also their capability; second, that victims often face shame in their 
communities, which can range from the victim becoming a social outcast in subtle ways 
to being forcibly removed from their families and communities; third, that perpetrators 
largely enjoy immunity, and punishment tends to be slow and ineffective when it even 
occurs, and finally, that international discourse on wartime rape tends to underrepresent 
victim narratives, which is in large part due to the obstacles that victims face in coming 
forward to share their stories. This essay seeks to understand what factors make 
interventions and post-conflict actions that address wartime rape most effective. The 
hypotheses are as follows: 	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H1: Interventions into conflicts where wartime rape occurs are most effective when they 
are inclusive to a feminist and intersectional framework to avoid leaving out and 
silencing survivors. 
 
H2: Post-conflict actions to address conflict-related sexual violence are most effective 
when they seek to grant reparations to victims of conflict-related sexual violence, 
prosecute perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, and change the culture of 
silence that discourages victims from telling their stories. 
 
IV. Methodology 
 
 This study employs a multi-case study methodology to understand the post-
conflict actions that were taken in two cases of wartime rape that occurred in Guatemala 
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Kirby and Kuehnast note, most of the studies into 
wartime rape are focused on individual cases that occur in a single region.40 While these 
studies offer in-depth analysis and commentary on the violence that occurred, they tend 
to lack a comprehensive view on the subject that can be generalized to other regions. This 
makes it difficult for research into sexual violence in conflict to drive policy, since 
solutions that may work in one region may not work in a different region that has conflict 
driven by a completely different history. Although the two cases of the Guatemalan civil 
war (1960-1996) and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) experienced their most 
violent periods during very different time periods on opposite sides of the world, a 
comparison of these two cases presents a useful addition to the literature on wartime rape 
and interventions into it. For one, both of these cases were influenced by the Cold War, 
which meant both that each conflict as well as the responses to them were highly 
influenced by the ideological conflict between capitalist democracy and communism. 
This fills a lack of case studies that examine conflicts in different parts of the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paul Kirby and Kathleen Kuehnast, “What Do We Really Know About Wartime Rape?” Foreign Policy 
(2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/10/what-do-we-really-know-about-wartime-rape/. 
21	  	  
finding patterns of what worked and what didn’t work in very different conflicts and 
recommends that future research have a more policy-driven framework.  
This study utilizes qualitative data of first- and second-hand accounts of sexual 
violence during the conflicts. Sexual violence in this study includes rape, forced 
pregnancy, and forced sterilization or abortion; sexual slavery and forced prostitution are 
excluded from this study to restrict its focus. To measure the effectiveness of 
interventions and post-conflict actions that address wartime rape, this study reviews 
organizational reports on these actions and reports by truth commissions that addressed 
sexual violence during war. 
 This study reviewed organizational reports and documents by state, 
intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors about responses to the conflicts in 
Guatemala and in Bosnia. In measuring effectiveness, this study takes notes the extent to 
which the document discusses sexual violence during conflict, if at all; the framework 
through which sexual violence during conflict is discussed and whether an intersectional 
lens is used (that is, if the document discusses sexual violence during conflict in the 
context of ethnicity, socioeconomic background, and other identity-based factors); and 
whether the documentation recommends to: 
1. Provide aid, rehabilitation, and/or reparations to survivors of sexual violence 
2. Prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence 
3. Introduce long-term strategies to change the culture of silence surrounding sexual 
violence during conflict 
 
Because many of the reports used within this study have been written in the last two 
decades and follow-up reports are still on-going, it’s not possible at this time to measure 
whether the recommendations made have been carried out and the extent to which 
they’ve been effective in meeting their goals. Therefore, the effectiveness of responses to 
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sexual violence during conflict are measured based on the recommendations they make 
and the framework through which they discuss the violence that occurred.  
V. Historical Overview of Case Studies 
 
Guatemala’s Civil War: 1960-1996 
 
Latin America’s longest civil war in recent memory raged for 36 years and is 
estimated to have taken the lives of more than 200,000 people. The majority of the 
violence was perpetuated against Guatemala’s indigenous populations, and according to 
the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), the Guatemalan government committed 
90% of the deaths, disappearances, and human rights violations during the war.41 The 
roots of this conflict stretch back to Guatemala’s colonialist history, which uprooted the 
region’s indigenous social structures and replaced them with a capitalist socio-economic 
order based on forced labor. Even after Guatemala declared independence from its 
Spanish colonizers in 1821, the legacy of colonialism persisted through military 
dictatorships whose power remained in the landed oligarchy. This legacy was challenged 
in 1944 with the election of a civilian government led by Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo 
Árbenz Guzmán, who championed left-wing land reforms. This threatened the interests 
of international corporations and investors, including the United States. In 1954, the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency launched a coup d’état against President Árbenz, installing a 
military dictatorship led by right-wing Carlos Castillo Armas, who immediately began 
silencing leftist movements and undoing the leftist reforms of the previous decade. These 
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actions sparked a failed left-wing revolt against the government in November 1960, 
which triggered the civil war.42 
Throughout the 1960s, rebel forces formed different groups and movements that 
opposed the U.S.-backed military dictatorships because of their authoritarian leadership 
and corruption. The Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre (MR-13), the Rebel 
Armed Forces (FAR), and the Edgar Ibarra Guerrilla Front (FGEI) were amongst the 
most influential insurgency movements during the beginning of the war, and became 
increasingly militarized as the Guatemalan Armed Forces responded with 
counterinsurgency actions that the U.S. government supplemented with military 
assistance.43 For the United States, this conflict presented an opportunity to carry out the 
aims of the Cold War to dispel communist movements within Latin America. Thus, 
counterinsurgency efforts were high stakes for U.S. foreign policy. 
For the indigenous populations in Guatemala, the leftist insurgency movements 
were often perceived as a form of hope for empowering their communities and bringing 
about economic reform to end their marginalization. However, the Guatemalan military 
viewed this support as a great threat and focussed its counterinsurgency efforts upon 
indigenous communities, one of the most prominent being the Ixil ethnic enclave in the 
Quiche province. Declassified CIA documents show that the U.S. government was well 
aware of the violence against civilians in these communities, which are discussed later.44 
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These years of the early 1980s were the most violent period of the war. Romeo 
Lucas Garcia’s regime from 1978 to 1982 escalated counterterror military actions against 
guerrilla insurgencies that prompted urban protests and contention within the 
government. Garcia’s 1981 Operation Ceniza increased violence against indigenous 
civilians in the countryside, during which the Guatemalan army destroyed and burned 
villages, crops, animals and any means of survival for the victims. These actions 
unintentionally increased sympathy for the guerrilla movements, which worsened 
relations between the military and Garcia’s regime.45 In 1982, General Efraín Ríos Montt 
staged a coup d’état against Garcia, after which Montt strengthened power by eliminating 
his opponents within the government. The new regime launched a new counterinsurgency 
program, Victoria 82, which sought to destroy the guerrilla movements through scorched 
earth tactics while offering government welfare and assistance to civilians as incentive to 
abandon support for the insurgency. While the massacres took place, the Guatemalan 
military took women and girls as sexual slaves and used weaponized rape as part of their 
counterinsurgency tactics. The death toll rose considerably during the regimes of Garcia 
and Montt. The number of extrajudicial killings rose from 100 in 1978 to more than 
10,000 in 1981. During Montt’s scorched earth campaign, the CEH estimated that over 
70,000 indigenous people were killed or forcibly disappeared. 46 
The remainder of the war saw a decrease in military violence largely due to the 
international pressure triggered by the publication of I, Rigoberta Menchú, a memoir 
written by an indigenous activist whose father had died in during a rebellion against the 
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military. General Mejía Victores, who gained power in 1983, introduced democratic 
reforms within Guatemala in response to the international attention on the human rights 
violations being committed by the military. With the international community putting 
political and economic pressure on Guatemala to improve its human rights record, 
democratically-elected civilian governments rose to power, however, they often still 
delegated power to the army.47 The 1993 election of Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro 
de León Carpio invigorated the peace process, which was being brokered by the United 
Nations. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) transitioned from a 
guerrilla organization to a political party, and signed agreements with the government on 
human rights, resettlement of displaced persons, historical clarification and indigenous 
rights from 1994 to 1995. In 1996, newly-elected President Álvaro Arzú signed a peace 
accord with the URNG that officially ended the civil war. In the aftermath of the war, 
investigations into human rights abuses, including the UN-mandated CEH, estimated that 
over 200,000 people had been killed or disappeared, and that the Guatemalan military 
was responsible for 93% of the human rights violations, while the insurgents were 
responsible for 3%. The CEH also found that 83% of the victims of violence were 
Maya.48 
 The aftermath of the war has led to increased international awareness of the 
human rights violations during the Guatemala civil war, though post-conflict actions have 
been viewed as too little, too late for survivors. This is especially true for the case of a 
group of women who have been called the Sepur Zarco Grandmothers. The village of 
Sepur Zarco was the site of systematic rape of indigenous Q’eqchi’ women by the 	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Guatemalan military from 1982 to 1988.49 These women, whose husbands were killed, 
detained or forcibly disappeared, were forced into sexual slavery and were used as 
domestic servants by soldiers. The age of these survivors is a clear testament to the lack 
of effective actions taken to help survivors; one woman, Demecia Yat de Xol was 28 at 
the time that she was forced into sexual slavery. At the time of the Sepur Zarco trial in 
Guatemala’s High-Risk Court in 2016, Demecia was 61 years old. This case was the first 
time any national court had ruled on charges of wartime sexual slavery, and the court 
noted that systematic rape was used as a deliberate strategy by the Guatemalan military. 
While this trial was groundbreaking in many ways, it serves as a reminder that survivors 
of sexual violence during the Guatemalan civil war have had to wait 33 years before 
receiving a semblance of justice. 
 
The Bosnian War: 1992-1995 
 
 As the Guatemalan civil war was nearing a close, a different conflict rooted in 
ethnic tensions was just beginning on the other side of the world in the former 
Yugoslavia region. Also an internal conflict, the Bosnian War was further complicated by 
the triangular nature of the fighting. The events leading up to the war were marked by the 
end of the Cold War, which led to the breakup of the communist state Yugoslavia. The 
entire Balkans region had experienced tensions among different ethnic groups throughout 
the twentieth century, and these tensions played out between three main ethnic groups in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslim Bosnians, also known as Bosniaks, who made up about 
44% of the population; Serbs, who made up 32.5%, and Croats, who made up 17%. The 	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other 6% described themselves as Yugoslav.50 Each ethnic group harbored resentments 
against the others, and these tensions were made explicit as each nationality had the 
chance to establish their own independent states as the Cold War drew to a close. 
 The rise of Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević in the 1980s intensified the 
tensions, especially that of Serbian aggression against Croats and Bosniaks. When the 
1990 elections in Bosnia formed a coalition government split between Serb, Croat and 
Bosniak parties, Bosnian Serbs sought to secede and seek self-determination.51 When 
Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović declared Bosnia an independent state and withdrew his 
signature from the coalition agreement in 1992, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić 
and his party broke away from government, forming their Republika Srpska. Bosnian 
Serb armed forces launched a bombardment of the capital of Bosnia, Sarajevo in May 
1992. The Serbian forces expanded their offensive to Bosniak-dominated towns and used 
forced displacement, massacres, torture, and systematic rape to expel Bosniaks. These 
actions were later described as ethnic cleansing.  
 While it’s important to stress that the violence during the Bosnian War was 
perpetuated on all sides of the conflict against all sides, the majority of violence was by 
Bosnian Serbs against Bosniaks. Part of the reasoning for this was that the Bosniak armed 
forces were severely ill fortified, while the Bosnian Serb armed forces were backed by 
the stronger Yugoslav army. One of the most brutal incidences of violence committed 
against Bosniaks by Bosnian Serbs was the Srebrenica Massacre of 1995. By this point in 
the war, the United Nations had sent peacekeeping forces to protect towns that were still 
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under control of the Bosnian government, which were Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. 
The peacekeeping effort had been perceived as largely ineffective due to their mandate 
not to use force to protect civilians, only to protect humanitarian aid. Despite the U.N. 
calling Srebrenica a safe haven, Bosnian Serb forces were able to overwhelm the town in 
July 1995. The Bosniak civilians were separated and the women and girls were sent 
away, many of whom would be raped by Serbian soldiers. The remaining boys and men 
were killed or transferred to mass killing sites. The death toll is estimated to be over 
7,000.  
 Wartime rape was used during the Bosnian War by Serb forces as a weapon of 
genocide and a form of ethnic cleansing against Bosniaks. Sites of rape ranged from the 
public, to the homes of both the victims and the perpetrators, to designated rape camps, 
such as the Partizan Sports Hall, where Bosniak women were held and raped multiple 
times until made pregnant, so as to disrupt Bosniak lineage as well as to demoralize and 
terrorize their communities. Perpetrators also sought to humiliate the victims of sexual 
violence, such as in the cases of women who were raped in front of their families, as well 
as cases of men who were forced to have sexual relations with other men, who in some 
cases were their own fathers or sons. Public rapes were used to instil fear and often 
occurred as part of the looting and destruction of enemy territory. Finally, rape was used 
as a form of torture to extract information from the victims. The U.N.-established 
Commission of Experts reported that some Serb soldiers said they had been forced to 
rape during the war, which supports the claim that systematic rape was used as a military 
strategy by the Serb forces.52 
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The Srebrenica massacre combined with the later Serbian capture of Zepa 
prompted the international community into stronger action that led to the end of the war. 
After initial U.N. peace agreements failed to be accepted by the Serbs, NATO assisted 
Bosniak and Croat forces to bomb the Serb forces. This assault combined with U.N. 
economic sanctions against Serbia led Milošević to finally enter into peace negotiations. 
In November 1995, Izetbegović, Milošević and Croat President Franjo Tudjman signed 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which divided the country into Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton accord increased Bosnian Serb 
territory from 46% to about 49%, Bosniak territory (which includes Sarajevo) from 28% 
to 30%, and decreased Bosnian Croat territory from 25% to 21%.53  
The estimated death toll during the Bosnian War has been subject to controversy, 
ranging from as low as 25,000 to as high as 329,000. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found during its research that the estimated death toll 
was 104,732. Of those killed, Bosniaks experienced the highest death toll at 68,101.54 
Established by the U.N. and located in the Hague, Netherlands, the ICTY sought to 
prosecute perpetrators of war crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars. Milošević was 
initially indicted in 1999 for crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo, and charges 
of genocide in Croatia and Bosnia were added a year later. Radovan Karadžić was also 
indicted for charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, though he was in hiding 
until his arrest in 2008. Other perpetrators of violence were also charged during the 
Tribunal. The ICTY was heralded as a step away from impunity towards accountability 	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and justice for war crimes and genocidal violence, and established wartime rape as a form 
of torture and a crime against humanity.  
VI. Findings and Analysis 
 
The United States had a much more active role in the Guatemalan civil war than it 
did in the Bosnian War, so CIA documents regarding the U.S. policy in Guatemala 
during its internal armed conflict are reviewed within this study to show how the U.S. 
perspective on human rights violations during the war changed over time. Six 
declassified CIA documents from 1982 to 1991 were reviewed to demonstrate this 
change in perspective. A 1982 secret cable shows the CIA’s support for the Guatemalan 
military at the time when it was committing some of the worst human rights violations of 
the war.55 This cable describes how any resistance shown to the army led to the 
assumption that the entire town or village was aligned with the Guerrilla Army of the 
Poor (EGP), and was subsequently destroyed. Empty towns and villages were also 
assumed to be aligned with insurgency movements, and were destroyed as well. An 
ending comment in this document makes clear the U.S. position on the Guatemalan 
military’s actions: “the well-documented belief by the army that the entire Ixil population 
is pro-EGP has created a situation in which the army can be expected to give no quarter 
to combatants and non-combatants alike.”56 Even when presented with reports on human 
rights violations by outside organizations such as Amnesty International, 
WOLA/NISGUA, and the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, the CIA proclaims in 
a 1982 confidential cable that “a concerted disinformation campaign is being waged in 	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the U.S. against the Guatemalan government by groups supporting the communist 
insurgency in Guatemala; this has enlisted the support of conscientious human rights and 
Church organizations which may not fully appreciate that they are being utilized.”57 This 
cable claims that the human rights violations that are outlined in the organizational 
reports never occurred, and that the majority of atrocities were, in fact, committed by the 
guerrillas.  
A 1989 CIA secret cable appears more aware of human rights violations but still 
absolves the Guatemalan military from most of the blame, writing, “regarding the role of 
the military in human rights violations, the possibility cannot be ruled out, but there are 
no signs of official military involvement in […] cases actively under investigation.”58 A 
1990 Department of State secret cable instructs the U.S. embassy to seek a meeting with 
President Cerezo to inform him of the halt of U.S. military aid.59 This action is due to the 
murder of an American citizen, Michael DeVine, for which the U.S. government feels is 
not being taken seriously enough by the Cerezo government. This document shows that 
despite being fully aware of human rights violations being perpetuated against 
Guatemalan civilians, the U.S. government didn’t cut off military support until the 
violence reached a U.S. citizen. The document’s description on the NSA Archive notes 
that even after overt military aid to the Guatemalan military was halted in 1990, secret 
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CIA funds continued to be delivered to the Guatemalan armed forces in the following 
years, and were only cut off once they were made public.60 
A 1991 Department of State confidential cable states that the Guatemalan 
government has met, or is working on meeting, the human rights targets set by the U.S. 
government.61 The benchmarks described are as follows: 
Benchmark 1: Progress on the Devine case 
Benchmark 2: Santiago de Atitlan Massacre 
Benchmark 3: ICRC Agreement and Registry of Detainees 
Benchmark 4: Executive help to the Ombudsman 
Benchmark 5: Periodic meetings between the executive and human rights 
groups and activists 
Other human rights objectives: 
General objective A: Make police accountable for abuses 
General objective B: Establish consistent police leadership distinct from 
the military 
General objective C: Reform the criminal justice system 
There is no mention in this document of any sexual violence during the conflict, 
nor is there mention of violence perpetuated by the Guatemalan military against 
indigenous populations, which further demonstrates the lack of a feminist 
framework within U.S. policy in Guatemala. In a 1993 Department of State secret 
cable, the Clinton administration’s ambassador to Guatemala, Marilyn McAfee, 
was concerned that the pressure the United States government had exerted on the 
Guatemala government to improve its human rights record is alienating the 
Guatemalan military.62 This sheds a light into some reasons that members of the 
U.S. government, however sympathetic they may have been to victims of human 
rights violations, failed to acknowledge the worst of the violence and put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Kate Doyle and Carlos Osorio, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala, 1966-1996,” The National Security Archive, 
Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/ 
61 Department of State, “GOG Meets Most FMF Human Rights Benchmarks: Time for “Small Steps” in 
Response to Big Ones,” The National Security Archive, Nov 1991. 
62 Department of State, “Concerns Over the Military,” The National Security Archives, Feb 1992.  
33	  	  
appropriate pressure on the Guatemalan military to improve its human rights 
record. From these documents, it’s clear that U.S. actions in Guatemala were 
severely ineffective in standing against violence perpetuated by the Guatemalan 
military against the indigenous population. These documents also make an 
important case that acknowledgement of human rights violations by powerful 
international actors is a vital first step of any response to the violence that can 
lead to justice. 
 The U.N.-mandated Historical Clarification Commission conducted an in-
depth investigation into the human rights violations in 1994, including wartime 
rape that occurred during the Guatemalan civil war.63 Though the findings of the 
truth commission are considered to be the most accurate description of military-
sanctioned violence during the conflict, researchers and activists have criticized 
the tone of reconciliation present throughout the report.64 This report does meet 
some standards that make it an effective response to wartime rape. The 
commission states that its purpose was to withhold judgment and only report on 
and clarify events of the war. It begins by discussing the sources of the conflict, 
concluding that Guatemala’s colonial history of racism, authoritarianism and 
exclusion was largely to blame. In discussing the rise of guerrilla movements, the 
commission finds that guerrillas aimed to increase their military strength in 
undemocratic ways, and holds the guerrillas partly responsible for the increase of 
political intolerance and polarization. The commission provides reasoning for the 
acts of terror committed during the war: 	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“The terror created was not just a result of the acts of violence or the 
military operations; it was also generated and sustained by other related 
mechanisms, such as impunity for the perpetrators, extensive campaigns to 
criminalize the victims and the forced involvement of civilians in the 
causal sequence leading up to the actual execution of atrocities.”65 
 
While sexual violence is not mentioned during this point, it lends logic to why the armed 
forces used sexual violence, as well as the CEH’s point about how victims were 
criminalized to turn them into legitimate victims. Sexual violence was an extremely 
efficient form of criminalization due to the cultural stigma surrounding sexuality. Raping 
women and girls turned them into outcasts in their own communities, which made it 
easier to legitimize violence against them. By delegitimizing, stigmatizing and destroying 
the dignity of the victims, the army signaled to indigenous communities “the exercise of 
their rights as citizens could mean death.”66 For rape victims, this “death” took the form 
of being abandoned by families and communities. Although the CEH goes on to briefly 
discuss the toll to women and rape of women committed largely by the armed forces 
against Mayan women, the level of analysis into why this atrocity occurred is more 
absent than in discussions into other forms of violence. 
After outlining the human rights violations that occurred, the CEH discusses 
reconciliation and the memory of truth. It discusses how reconciliation has been 
embraced by some parts of the government, and outlines its recommendations, which 
largely center on preserving the memory and securing justice for victims while also 
strengthening democracy and peace within Guatemala. “The CEH is convinced that 
construction of peace, founded on the knowledge of the past, demands that those affected 
by the armed confrontation and the violence connected with it are listened to and no 	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longer considered solely as victims, but as the protagonists of a future of national 
harmony.”67 The CEH makes little mention of how victims of violence responded, if it at 
all, to the idea of reconciliation and democratic peace. Since the truth commission’s 
investigation, researchers have argued that the CEH fell short in holding the army 
sufficiently responsible for the crimes it committed. The CEH reports that the army was 
responsible for 85% of the violence during the war, while the guerrillas were responsible 
for only 3%, yet the report points out violence on both sides disproportionally and 
displays a tone of reconciliation throughout the report.68 Without a stronger focus on 
survivors of wartime rape, responses cannot be effective in making recommendations that 
focus on rehabilitation and reparations for survivors, as well as prosecution for 
perpetrators. 
The United Nations Human Rights Commission’s (UNHRC) universal periodic 
review of human rights in Guatemala utilizes a framework that is gender-based and 
sometimes intersectional. It reviews the steps that Guatemala has taken in regards to 
furthering its human rights policies and actions, while noting areas where the state can 
continue to improve. Discrimination against and the rights of indigenous people is 
mentioned in the review twice, while laws on femicide (the gender-based murder of 
women and girls) and approaches to reduce violence against women and increase female 
empowerment is mentioned eight times, though issues specifically pertaining to 
indigenous women is not mentioned in this review. While these specific statements 
regarding violence against women and discrimination of indigenous peoples are 
important to acknowledge, Guatemala does not acknowledge the wartime rape that 	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occurred during the civil war period. It is only later, when other states and organizations 
have a chance to make their recommendations heard that instances of wartime rape is 
brought up. Amnesty International points to the CEH recommendation No. 47, which 
relates to the prosecution and punishment for perpetrators of crimes under international 
law committed during the internal armed conflict.  
“Amnesty International was concerned at the refusal of the military to 
release key documents relating to the military operations conducted during 
the internal armed conflict […] Amnesty International called upon 
Guatemala to ensure that no one responsible for crimes under international 
law was granted an amnesty, and to implement the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of 2011 relating to consultations with indigenous 
peoples.”69 
 
 A report made by Amnesty International goes into further detail about the 
Guatemalan army’s refusal to comply with a judicial order regarding the declassification 
of documents regarding military operations during the Guatemalan civil war. While the 
army released part of the documents that were ordered to be declassified, documents from 
the most violent period of the war, 1980-1985, were not among those released.70 Even the 
documents that have been declassified have not been indexed, summarized or 
systematized, and are only available for public use in their physical forms in the offices 
of the army’s Joint Chiefs of Staff in Guatemala City.	  The army’s refusal to release 
military documents from 1980-1985 has grim consequences for its progress on improving 
human rights. Leaving the international community unaware of the extent of the human 
rights violations that occurred during the internal armed conflict allows the Guatemalan 
military to avoid taking full responsibility for its actions, and therefore does not give 	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policymakers the opportunity to introduce reform to prevent such occurrences from 
happening again, because they would not know exactly what happened. It also 
perpetuates the culture of impunity that prevents survivors of sexual violence from 
receiving reparations and rehabilitation. For all of the progress that [seems to] have been 
made with regard to Guatemala’s human rights image, the problems outlined by Amnesty 
International show that international pressure and investigation has not proved effective 
enough to change the culture of impunity surrounding the wartime rape that occurred 
during the Guatemalan civil war’s most violent period. 
Responses to the wartime rape that occurred during the Bosnian War have been 
markedly different than those to wartime rape in Guatemala, largely because of increased 
international awareness of the sexual violence in Bosnia. The narratives of public rape 
and rape camps shocked and horrified the international community, leading to more 
robust calls for intervention into the conflict than before. During a panel discussion 
presented at the Tenth Annual Whittier International Law Symposium in 1993, Jane 
Olson, co-chair of Human Rights Watch California, said, “The most important response 
to [the human rights abuses in Bosnia] in human terms might have been, but has not 
been, some form of effective intervention” (emphasis mine).71 The reason for a lack of 
effective intervention in the early conflict continues to be debated, but there tends to be 
agreement7273 that the publicizing of the narratives of human rights abuses became a 
catalyst for finally organizing a humanitarian intervention. Still, as has been previously 
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noted, the intervention that occurred was not viewed as effective because of its inability 
to protect civilians due to its mandate that negated the use of force.  
While there was increased attention to the narratives of survivors of wartime rape 
in Bosnia following the conflict, some survivors felt taken advantage of. News reporters, 
journalists and scholars asked many women about their stories and recounted them in 
articles, books and documentaries. Clark reflects that while many non-governmental 
organizations based in the Balkan region (including Tuzla-based Snaga Žene) connected 
her with victims who were willing to tell their stories, other organizations were wary of 
reporters.74 One told Clark that “neither she nor any of the women in her association 
would speak to me unless I was willing to pay them because they had been misused too 
many times in the past.”75 These reflections give a rare glimpse into how survivors of 
wartime rape view the international community’s responses. Unfortunately, according to 
the those interviewed by Clark, such responses have fallen short of centering survivors. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW)’s concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic 
reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in 2013, shed a light into how the 
interventions of the Bosnian war were ineffective in long-term protection of survivors of 
wartime rape. Every point of concern for CEDAW is related to the failure to grant justice 
and compensation for survivors, as well as the failure to hold perpetrators accountable for 
their crimes during the war. These concerns are outlined below. 
a) The slow pace of prosecutions and very low level of conviction rates of 
perpetrators of sexual violence, which result in pervasive impunity, 	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despite the implementation of the 2008 national war crimes prosecution 
strategy; 
b) The inadequate definition, as both the State and entity levels, of acts of 
sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity, in particular 
the elements of the crime of rape, which are not in line with international 
standards; the large number of cases at the district and cantonal levels, at 
which rape continues to be prosecuted as an ordinary crime, without 
taking into account the dimension of armed conflict; and the parallel 
applicability of different criminal codes, resulting in inconsistent 
jurisprudence and lenient sentencing practices; 
c) Long delays in adopting measures to address the needs of a large number 
of women victimized by the conflict; 
d) The lack of adequate victim reparation in war crimes trials, where victims 
are being referred to initiate separate civil proceedings, while such claims 
can be submitted and ruled upon during criminal proceedings; 
e) The deficiencies of witness protection measures in cases prosecuted at the 
district and cantonal levels, where the law on witness protection 
programme is not applicable; 
f) Women’s inadequate and unequal access to compensation, support and 
rehabilitation measures for violations suffered during the war, such as 
enforced disappearances. These measures include sustained psychological 
and medical support as well as financial and social benefits, which are 
regulated differently in the entities; 
g) The lack of measures taken to address the systematic stigmatization faced 
by women victims of wartime sexual violence, which hampers their access 
to justice and social reintegration.76 
 
Essentially, these remarks show that each indicator of an effective intervention measured 
in this study (justice for survivors of sexual violence, prosecution of perpetrators, and 
changing the culture that makes sexual violence during war possible) has not been met. 
That the remarks mention the 2008 war crimes prosecution strategy as being ineffective 
furthermore shows that post-conflict non-intervention responses have also failed to meet 
the above indicators of effectiveness. Yet, the Committee’s recommendations to remedy 
these concerns do not mention revising policy and legal frameworks to use intersectional 
approach, nor do they recommend working more closely with women’s advocacy groups 	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and networks, the importance of which scholars such as De Lellio and Clark have 
stressed.  
 The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human Rights discusses 
occurrences of wartime rape in conflicts all over the world. In its comments on the 
wartime rape that occurred during the Bosnian War, it discusses that the reasoning behind 
increased international attention to Bosnia may be attributable to efforts by women’s 
movements to condemn rape as a weapon of war and push for an end to impunity for 
perpetrators.77 The HRW conducted interviews of survivors, who spoke on their 
attackers’ confidence in the impunity they would likely enjoy following their crimes. The 
report then makes separate recommendations for governments and for the international 
community. To governments, the HRW recommends that: 
1. All incidents of wartime rape be fully investigated, prosecuted and 
punished;  
2. That military and civilian authority should publicly condemn wartime rape 
and emphasize their intention to prosecute and punish incidents; 
3. Include in military training explicit bans against the use of rape and make 
clear a no-tolerance policy of rape within the armed forces; 
4. Reform the legal framework on domestic laws against rape, specifically, 
a. “to classify in their legal codes a rape as a crime against women’s 
physical integrity and not as an offense against individual or 
community honor; 
b. to ensure that discriminatory attitudes about female rape victims 
neither prevent serious investigation of rape nor undermine rape’s 
equitable prosecution; and 
c. to ensure that medical and legal services provided by the state for 
the purpose of investigating rape are available to all women when 
and where they are needed;” 
5. Exercise jurisdiction to investigation any occurrences of wartime rape that 
occur within their state; and 
6. Support the efforts of international tribunals to investigate and prosecute 
wartime rape as a war crime.78 
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To the international community, the HRW recommends continued support for 
international legal framework that defines wartime rape as a crime against humanity and 
a war crime, as well as recommended that the U.N. increase investigations into wartime 
rape and reform the training of peacekeepers to make explicit that all forms of sexual 
violence are prohibited and will be investigated and punished.79 These recommendations 
go the farthest of any other report reviewed in this study, and as such is the most effective 
response to sexual violence during conflict. Still, while the HRW report makes clear 
recommendations to change the culture of silence and stigma surrounding wartime rape 
within communities as well as outlining clear methods to reverse the culture of impunity 
for perpetrators, it does fails to outline how governments can work to bring rehabilitation 
and reparations to survivors.  
VII. Conclusion 
 
This study sought to understand the effectiveness of international responses to 
wartime rape during the Guatemalan civil war and the Bosnian war. The hypothesis that 
such responses were most effective when they utilized a feminist, intersectional 
framework that centered factors of identity was supported by the data, although as 
governmental documents continue to be declassified and reports are followed up on, this 
study can be replicated to describe how recommendations made by these responses have 
or have not been met. Much of the research that has been conducted in post-conflict areas 
that experienced wartime rape has focused on publicizing victim narratives, but has not 
gone far enough to recommend actions to provide rehabilitation and reparations for 
survivors of wartime rape. Educating judges, prosecutors and lawyers on gender equality 	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law, as recommended by CEDAW’s 2013 report, does not go far enough in improving 
how wartime rape is viewed and approached on an internal legal level. Similarly, the 
recommendation that Bosnia and Herzegovina “increase women’s awareness of their 
rights and the remedies available to enable them to seek redress in cases of gender-based 
discrimination”80 fails to acknowledge the role that communities and families play in 
silencing victims. If this culture of violence is not acknowledged, survivors of conflict-
related sexual assault continued to be discouraged in seeking justice for the crimes they 
experienced. While the Committee does later recommend that the state encourage women 
to report domestic violence and de-stigmatize victims, it’s not clear how this de-
stigmatization can be practically implemented, and the fact this recommendation doesn’t 
extend to conflict-related sexual violence hinders the ability for this recommendation to 
be implemented in a way that reaches all victims of sexual violence. 
Throughout the review of these reports, it has become clear that when there is no 
acknowledgement of wartime rape, survivors suffer and perpetrators enjoy impunity for 
their crimes. The Guatemalan army’s refusal to release military documents from 1980-
1985 has grim consequences for its progress on improving human rights. Leaving the 
international community unaware of the extent of the human rights violations that 
occurred during the internal armed conflict allows the Guatemalan military to avoid 
taking full responsibility for its actions, and therefore does not give policymakers the 
opportunity to introduce reform to prevent such occurrences from happening again, 
because they would not know exactly what happened. It also perpetuates the culture of 
impunity that prevents survivors of sexual violence from receiving reparations and 
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rehabilitation. For all of the progress that [seems to] have been made in regard to 
Guatemala’s human rights image, the problems outlined by Amnesty International show 
that international pressure and investigation has not proved effective enough to change 
the culture of impunity surrounding the wartime rape that occurred during the 
Guatemalan civil war’s most violent period.  
 This study was limited in scope, and could have explored more cases to come to a 
more refined conclusion. It also lacked the time and resources to conduct interviews with 
people involved in past interventions to gain a better understanding of how the 
interventions were set up. Still, the recommendations of this study can be expanded upon 
to contribute to policy that may prevent wartime rape from being as prevalent as it is. The 
majority of the research on wartime rape focuses on how and why it happens, but not 
enough has sought to understand how seemingly unrelated solutions may have an effect 
on the outcomes of conflict-related sexual violence. For example, after the war in Bosnia, 
many survivors were pushing for humanitarian aid, such as medical support, food, and 
housing. Future research should look at how this type of aid may affect the gender norms 
of a community to change the culture of silence surrounding sexual violence. 
Additionally, more research must be done to understand how military groups can change 
internal norms to prevent sexual violence during conflict from becoming a military 
strategy. Finally, while researchers are increasingly calling for a change in international 
legal frameworks to call wartime rape a crime against humanity, or a war crime, more 
research must be done to understand how this type of framework can be put in place on 
an international scale. 
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 For too long, wartime rape has gone unacknowledged by governments and the 
international community. The consequences of this have been felt hardest by survivors, 
who often can’t speak about their experiences when the world is not listening. Survivors’ 
stories must be used not as shocking displays of the worst of humanity, but as a call to 
action to support people who have gone through so much pain and trauma. The 
international community has a duty not to let survivors become grandmothers before they 
see justice. There is a duty to respond with action, and to do so effectively. 
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